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Inflation and Accumulation: The Case of Israel 
JONATHAN NITZAN and SHIMSHON BICHLER* 
ABSTRACT: A new theoretical framework links inflation and ac-
cumulation, with the Israeli experience as a case study. The focal 
point is the process of differential accumulation by the largest 
core firms. The theory of differential accumulation suggesL~ that 
the relative power of these firms can be augmented either through 
"breadth" (relative employment) or "depth" (relative profit per 
employee). In the Israeli case, inflation accelerated after the 1970s 
when the large core firm began shifting their emphasis from 
breadth to depth. The paper examines the political-economic 
conditions typical of each ofthese regimes, why these conditions 
changed in Israel, and how the distributive gains of the core firms 
pushed the country onto the brink of hyperinflation. It then ar-
ticulates the inherent limits of a "depth" regime and shows how 
Israel reached those limits during the early 1980s, bringing the 
inflation spiral to an end. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
T HE RISE AND DECLINE OF ISRAELI INFLATION - from two percent in the mid-1960s, to over 400 percent in the mid-1980s, to less than ten percent in the late 1990s - remains a 
riddle for Israeli economists (Levitan and Pitterman, 1989,437). Par-
ticularly mysterious, write Razin and Sadka (1993,3), is the fact that 
this rise and fall was counter-cyclical: the low inflation of the early years 
was associated with rapid economic growth, the high inflation of the 
1970s and 1980s with stagnation, and the disinflation of the 1990s 
with an apparent "overheated" economy. 
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A large part of the riddle has to do with the methods used to solve 
it. Most of those writing on the subject willingly arrest themselves in 
the ahistorical straightjacket of orthodox macroeconomics. Their 
common starting point is that inflation comes from excess demand, 
with the main debate revolving around the specific source of this 
excess. The usual suspects are all "autonomous": greedy workers, for-
eign oil sheiks, and of course half-witted, weak politicians. Fortunately, 
though, since inflation is created "by will," it can also be stopped at 
will. All it takes is visionary statesmen who will listen to professional 
economists and implement bold (albeit) orthodox policies. 
The purpose of this paper is to offer an alternative way of under-
standing the inflationary experience of Israel, situating it within a 
broader theoretical framework of capital accumulation. Viewed from 
this perspective, inflation is neither the consequence of market im-
perfections, nor the result of misguided policies, but rather part of 
an ongoing restructuring of capitalist society. The central facet of this 
restructuring, we argue, is the process of differential accumulation, that 
is, the progressive redistribution of ownership claims in favor of domi-
nant capital groups. This latter process can be sustained in a num-
ber of different ways, one of which is inflation. The implication is that 
in order to understand when, why and how inflation rises and falls, 
we first need to articulate the broader processes affecting accumula-
tion in general, and differential accumulation in particular. 
The second section of the paper outlines the basic concept of dif-
ferential accumulation and the two principal regimes through which 
it unfolds. The third section applies this framework to the Israeli case, 
examining some of its main historical contours: the rise of inflation 
during the 1970s and 1980s and the underlying political-economic 
forces sustaining it. The fourth section situates the inflationary process 
in the wider discussion of power and conflict. The final section exam-
ines the transition since the mid-1980s to a period of low inflation. 
2. DIFFERENTIAL ACCUMUlATION : CAPITAL AS POWERI 
As implied by its name, capital is the central institution of capitalism. 
It is therefore surprising that no one really knows exactly what it is. 
This section is a mere outline. For more on the theory of differential accumulation, its 
implications and applications, see Nitzan (1992; 1998; 1999), Bichler and Nitzan (1996a; 
1996b) and Nitzan and Bichler (1995; 1996; 1999; 2000; 2001). 
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Most people think of capital as something "real," in the sense of 
machines, buildings, or more broadly as a technological process. 
But that is too simple. All of these material "things" existed well 
before capitalism, as well as in parallel systems such as communism 
and fascism. Moreover, capital can exist and expand with little or 
no machinery - consider the case of Microsoft, whose highly "non-
mechanized" operations nonetheless generate one of the world's 
fastest rates of capitalization. 
The key to the enigma of capital is anchored in the relationship 
between income and productivity. For business people, capital is sim-
ply the capitalization of future profit expectations (Veblen, 1904, 
1923). Mainstream economists, despite the legacy of the Cambridge 
Controversy, continue to assume that such earnings come from the 
productivity of machines and structures owned by the firm. But then, 
how should we reconcile this belief with something such as the re-
cent Asian crisis, where capital values were buried under an avalanche 
of new capital goods? Arguably, the root cause of this crisis was "over-
investment" (understood in a business sense). Encouraged by cheap 
loans and ever growing exports, Asian companies went on augment-
ing their productive capacity well beyond what could be sold at profit-
able prices. Eventually, the discrepancy triggered a loss of confidence, 
culminating in massive decumulation. In other words, a rise in the 
"quantity of machines" led to a fall in the "quantity of capital." An 
opposite example is offered by the "capitalization" of the former 
Soviet Union, where rapid amalgamation of private wealth was 
achieved through a massive destruction of productive capacity. 
How is this possible? How could more machines lead to less capi-
tal, and fewer machines to more capital? The answer is simple: capi-
tal has to do not with machines and their utilization, but with profits, 
and the relationship between profit and production is complex and 
potentially nonlinear. Up to a point, profit increases with output, but 
then, if output growth turns into glut, the relationship could become 
negative, leading to business ruin. More generally, profit is deter-
mined not only by how much is produced and sold, but also by the 
manifold political institutions of distribution. The conventional wis-
dom that each factor of production gets paid what it contributes at 
the margin is nothing but a well-defended myth, as the high priests 
of neoclassical economics reluctantly admit (Samuelson, 1962; 
Ferguson, 1969). For a start, no one has ever been able to observe 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
INFLATION AND ACCUMULATION 277 
individual factor contributions. Moreover, even if each factor of pro-
duction had its own intrinsic productivity - a very big if - the only 
way this could lead to a proportionate distribution of income is 
through perfectly competitive markets, which do not exist and per-
haps never did (Braudel, 1985). Markets usually operate with some 
principal actors who can affect production and prices. More impor-
tantly, markets never exist in a political vacuum. In the real world, 
market outcomes as well as their very existence, are political phenom-
ena (Polanyi, 1944). 
Accumulation, understood as the progressive capitalization of 
expanding profit, is a manifestation of numerous power arrangements 
and institutions. What makes profit possible is not productivity per se, 
but the strategic control of productivity for business ends. From this 
perspective, the study of accumulation is the study of politics at large, 
the deciphering of social power under capitalism. This, of course, is 
not new. Marx devoted much of his life to examining this link, as did 
many of his followers. Yet, the literature on power and accumulation 
remains besieged by a fundamental dilemma: it views social power 
and capital accumulation as related though essentially distinct phe-
nomena. Indeed, when it comes to measurement, both Marxist and 
neoclassical analysis count accumulation in the "materialistic" units 
of labor time and utils, respectively. Power can still influence accu-
mulation, of course, but only from the "outside." In contrast, our 
approach seeks to integrate both power and productivity into the very 
definition of capital. 
According to orthodox economics, capitalists are driven by the 
desire to maximize their hedonic pleasure, and the vehicle for doing 
so is profit maximization. We begin from a different starting point. 
Capitalists, we argue, are driven by the quest for power, not utility, 
and the way to achieve it is not by maximizing profit, but by "beating 
the average." The principal drive of capitalists, operating through 
their corporate organs, is to have their profit and capitalization ex-
pand faster than those of other owners; they seek not absolute accu-
mulation, but differential accumulation. 
Capitalist power is exercised over society as a whole. This is what 
is generally meant by the "power of capital" (Gill and Law, 1989). But 
that is not enough. The overall power of capital depends on its inter-
nal dynamics. If capitalist power were indeed as defused as the neo-
classicists suggest, the likely result would have been the disappear-
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ance of profit and possibly of capitalism itself. Capitalist power, like 
other forms of power, is based on exclusion. In other social systems, 
exclusion is usually the upshot of rigid, largely static customs. Under 
capitalism it is dynamically created through the formation and ref-
ormation of "distributional coalitions," to borrow the term coined 
by Olson (1982). The upshot is that the accumulation of capital in 
general depends on the accumulation of capital at the center. It is 
dominant capital, the large amalgamations at the core of the process, 
that are crucial. The periphery of capital, comprising the many capi-
tals outside the core, is in fact a constant threat to the general power 
of capital. Only to the extent that dominant capital is able to retain 
and augment its exclusive power against other lesser capitals, can the 
overall power of capital be sustained. 
In sum, power is both the end and the means of accumulation. 
On the one hand, profit is sought not for the sake of consumption, 
but as a code of power, reflected in the constant drive of business to 
"beat the average" and exceed the "normal rate of return." On the 
other hand, profit can be obtained and retained only through the 
formation of exclusive coalitions, preventing others from accessing 
the same sources of power. The dual role of power suggests that in 
measuring accumulation, our units should be relative, not absolute, 
and that our focus should be not only on capital as a whole, but also 
and perhaps more so on its internal organization. 
The locus of capital accumulation, we argue, is a differential 
process, a process by which the large corporate coalitions at the core 
of the political economy emerge, grow, and sometimes disintegrate 
and decline. The principal indicator for this process is the growth of 
profit and capitalization of the largest corporate groups relative to the 
economy's average. The process unfolds through what we call regimes 
of differential accumulation. These regimes are useful in understand-
ing the links between the process of accumulation on the one hand, 
and the general contours of capitalist development on the other. We 
turn to examine them now. 
Regimes of Differential Accumulation: An Analytical Framework 
By definition, the level of profit is the product of profit per em-
ployee and the number of employees. This suggests two basic ways 
for corporations to expand their control over profit: they can either 
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increase their breadth of accumulation by enlarging the size of their 
organization measured in terms of employment, or they can augment 
their depth of accumulation by raising their profit per unit of organi-
zation, measured in profit per employee. The depth of accumulation 
itself can be further decomposed as a product of three components: 
the markup expressed as the profit share of sales, the price level 
measured as the ratio between nominal sales and output volume, and 
output per employee (assuming all output is sold). Conceptually, we 
can write: 2 
(1) Profit = Breadth · Depth 
= (Employment) . (Profit per Employee) 
= (Employment) . (Markup· Price· Output per Employee) 
Now, our claim in the previous section was that in order to under-
stand the evolution of mature capitalism, we should focus on the larg-
est blocs of capital, as well as on capital at large. The key process, we 
argue, is the extent to which these core groups of dominant capital 
are able to "beat the average" and achieve a differential rate of accu-
mulation. This can be examined by expressing every component of 
equation (l) in relative terms, i.e., as a ratio between a typical domi-
nant capital firm and the average firm in the corporate universe: 3 
(2) Differential Profit = Breadth· Depth 
= (Differential Employment) . (Differential Profit 
per Employee) 
= (Differential Employment) . 
2 Symbolically, we can write: 
(Differential Markup· Differential Price · 
Differential Output per Employee) 
n = L · (niL) = L- (nl V) . (VI Q) . (Q! L) = L · K· p. A, 
where n is profit, L is employment , Vis sales, Q is output, K is the markup expressed as the 
profit share in sales (nl V), Pis the price level (VIQ), and A is output per employee (Q! L). 
3 Using stand-alone notations for dominant capital and the a subscript for the average firm, 
this can be written as: 
(nina) ~ (LI La) . unl L) I (n.; La ) 1 = (LI La) . (KI Ka) . (PI Pal . ( AI Aa) , 
where (LI La) is differential employment, [(n i L) I (n al La) 1 is differential profit per em-
ployee, (KI Ka) is the differential markup, (PI Pal is the differential price level and (AI Aa) 
is differential output per employee . 
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Now, looking at a financial asset as the present value of a profit stream, 
its rate of accumulation is given by the rate of growth of profit less 
the rate of growth of the discount factor. When we measure differen-
tial accumulation, though, the discount factor, which is common to 
all assets, drops out. The result is to make the rate of differential ac-
cumulation (DA) - in our case, the extent to which a typical core 
firm accumulates faster than the average firm - depend solely on 
the difference between their respective profit growth rates. Using 
equation (1), this can be further decomposed, such that: 4 
(3) DA = Breadth + Depth 
= (DifferentialEmployment Growth) + (Differential Growth of Profit 
per Employee) 
= (Differential Employment Growth) + 
(Differential Markup Growth + Differential Inflation + 
Differential Growth of Output per Employee) 
This framework for differential accumulation can be used at vari-
ous levels of analysis, from the individual core corporation, through 
corporate coalitions, to the corporate core as a whole. At every level, 
it enables us to examine accumulation and power not as distinct pro-
cesses that need to be related, but as two sides of the same process of 
capitalist development. The abstract crystallization of power appears 
on the left-hand side of our equations in the form of differential ac-
cumulation, while the concrete political-economic processes through 
which this power is formed and reformed appear on the right-hand 
side, as components of breadth and depth. 
Viewed as broad social regimes, depth and breadth involve dif-
ferent and often conflicting processes. Consider first the breadth 
route. Dominant capital groups could achieve differential employ-
ment growth either by adding new, "green-field" capacity faster than 
the average, or through amalgamation (which raises their own em-
ployment but not total employment). The preconditions for a sus-
4 With lower-<:ase notations denoting rates of change, stand-alone variables for dominant 
capital and the subscript a for the average firm. the rate of differential accumulation (DA) 
is given by: 
DA = 1t - 1t. = (1- I.) + (k - kal + (P - P.) + (a - aa)], 
where (I-I.) is differential employment growth, (k - ka ) is differential markup growth, (P - Pal is differential inflation and (a - a.) is the differential growth of output per employee. 
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tained breadth regime is overall employment growth, or expansion 
into new territory where the core groups do not yet operate. Other-
wise, added capacity is bound to become excessive, while the supply 
of new acquisition targets dries out. Politically, a breadth regime 
necessitates some measure of openness and stability, in the absence 
of which growth is undermined and capital mobility runs into barri-
ers. The combination of high growth, capital mobility and relative 
political stability works to mitigate both pricing power and the pres-
sure to use it. The result is that a breadth regime is commonly char-
acterized by relatively low inflation. 
A depth regime is far more conflictual. It involves either differ-
ential growth of output per employee (so-called "labor productivity") 
which necessitates the erecting of barriers to prevent competitors 
from using the same technology; differential inflation, which is self-
propelling and potentially destabilizing; or differential markup 
growth, which implies competitive redistribution and hence a height-
ened capital-labor conflict. Seen from a Veblenian perspective, all 
three mechanisms are based on "strategic limitation" by the core 
groups, who are able to politically "sabotage" society's productive 
effort for their own differential gain. The broad economic feature 
of the depth route is therefore stagflation - stunted growth, com-
bined with relatively high inflation. 
Generalized as regimes, breadth and depth are unlikely to take 
place simultaneously. Breadth involves a competitive capitalist race 
to grab new profit streams in the context of economic and employ-
ment growth. It thus weakens the ability and resolve of large firms to 
act in concert, openly or tacitly, in pursuit of capital-labor redistri-
bution, which is the main venue of depth. Similarly, differential ac-
cumulation through depth, because it thrives on limitation and "sabo-
tage," ends up hampering growth and spoiling the benign political 
climate necessary for unfettered corporate amalgamation. It thus 
undermines the very preconditions of breadth. 
Between the two regimes, breadth is the path of least resistance. 
Although growth may loosen business cooperation among the core 
groups and hence erode their pricing power, this is commonly toler-
ated in the expectation that such power will eventually be restored 
through amalgamation. In addition, growth tends to obscure the 
underlying capital-labor conflict, thus helping to consolidate the 
social hegemony of business institutions. Differential expansion via 
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breadth is not always feasible, though, and when circumstances under-
mine green-field investment and/ or amalgamation, the core reluc-
tantly gravitates toward depth. 
Compared with breadth, the depth route is far more contentious 
in methods, risky in application, and uncertain in outcomes. But the 
differential gains, at least in the short run, are potentially huge. The 
reason is that, contrary to breadth, where expansion is counted in 
employees, depth is counted in the much more "flexible" monetary 
units of profit. Unlike the rate of growth of the former, that of the 
latter has no inherent limit. The spoils, therefore, are commensurate 
with the risk, and when dominant capital is pushed to the wall, with 
no breadth left, the temptation and imperative to dive into depth are 
difficult to resist. 
This framework is not deterministic. We do not need to have either 
differential breadth or differential depth. Dominant capital may be 
unable to achieve a positive rate of differential accumulation, in which 
case one or both regimes will have been operating in "reverse," with 
the core companies trailing rather than beating the average. But if 
dominant capital does expand differentially, our framework suggests 
its expansion will likely occur through one of these regimes rather 
than both. 
3. THE ISRAELI CASE 
Turning to the Israeli case, our purpose is first to relate the country's 
broad political-economic development with the differential profit-
ability of its dominant capital, and then use this framework as a basis 
for understanding the rise and decline of inflation. The task is hardly 
simple, though. The main problem is lack of disaggregated data, 
particularly on the income side. For instance, the national accounts 
contain no specific breakdown of capital income by category (such 
as profit, rent and interest), there are no sectoral income accounts, 
and there is no systematic tracking of production and finances by 
corporate size. Fortunately, though, these hurdles are not insur-
mountable. We bypass them by using roundabout estimates, which 
although inaccurate, are nonetheless sufficiently robust for our pur-
pose of tracing overall trends. 
This section begins with a birds-eye decomposition of differen-
tial accumulation into breadth and depth. We define Israel's domi-
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nant capital as comprising the five largest corporate groups during 
the mid-1980s: Bank Hapoalim, Bank Leumi, Israel Discount Bank 
Holding (IDBH), Koor and Clal. The origin of these firms goes back 
to the early part of the century, and the history of their emergence, 
consolidation and ongoing restructuring is intimately intertwined 
with Israel's capitalist development (Frenkel and Bichler, 1984; 
Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan, 1988). 
We approximate three ratios based on equation (2): differential 
profit, differential employment (breadth) and differential profit per 
employee (depth). For differential profit, the numerator is given by 
overall net profit of the core divided by five. s The denominator, av-
erage profit per firm, is approximated indirectly. Although there are 
no national accounting data for overall profit, existing data can be 
used to derive a useful if rough proxy. This is computed by subtract-
ing from net national income the sum of wages and salaries, corpo-
rate taxes and income tax paid by unincorporated businesses. The 
result is a measure of non-labor income, which includes in addition 
to net profit also the net income of unincorporated business, rent 
and interest. Because profit is the most volatile component, its fluc-
tuations (although not levels) are likely to dominate and hence cor-
relate with those of non-labor income as a whole. This aggregate 
measure of non-labor income is then divided by the overall number 
of industrial establishments - a proxy for the number of firms -
yielding a rough index for the economy's average net profit per firm. 6 
Next, consider breadth measured by differential employment. 
Ideally, this could be observed directly by dividing average employ-
ment in the core by average employment per firm in the corporate 
universe. Neither ofthese figures is available, though, and both mea-
sures must therefore be approximated indirectly. Here too, we rely 
on data for industrial establishments. Specifically, we use the ratio 
between aggregate employment by all large establishments (each with 
300 or more employees), and the average employment per establish-
5 Systematic historical data on these groups are not publicly available, and were collated 
by the authors from indi~;dual financial reports (see Bichler and Nitzan, 1996a). 
6 Establishments are physical production locations. unlike firms which are legal entities. 
However, the vast majority of firms own a single establishment, so the overall number of 
firms tends to fluctuate .together with the overall number of establishments. Similarly, 
although the industrial sector per se accounts for only part of the corporate universe, cy-
clical changes in the number of firms due to incorporation, bankruptcy and amalgam-
ation tend to move in tandem across sectors. 
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ment in the industrial sector as a whole. Although this ratio is lim-
ited to the industrial sector and is based on establishments rather than 
on firms, its temporal movements should provide a good proxy for 
changes in differential employment by the core.7 Finally, the depth 
side, measured by differential profit per employee, is given by divid-
ing differential profit by differential employment. 
Figure 1 plots all three indices on a logarithmic scale (smoothed 
and normalized). The data point to the early 1970s as a watershed in 
Israeli differential accumulation. Until then, differential depth was 
dormant, with the core's profit per employee expanding roughly in 
line with the economy's average. Most of the action was in differen-
tial breadth, where the core firms expanded their employment rela-
tive to the averages - partly through differential absorption of newly 
proletarianized workers, but mostly through mergers and acquisi-
tions. Although prior data are unavailable, it is likely that breadth 
was the major source of differential accumulation through much of 
the 1950s and 1960s. Rapid economic growth, ushered in first by 
massive immigration, then by German Holocaust compensation, 
and finally by the incorporation of the Palestinians into the Israeli 
economy, meant that the "boundaries" of the corporate universe were 
constantly expanding. This, combined with the fact that during this 
initial phase the large companies were still relatively small, implied 
an ample supply of takeover targets. Inflation in that period was rela-
tively low, suggesting that the struggle over profit per employee was 
muted. Whatever differential accumulation occurred in that period 
must hence be attributed largely to breadth. 
The situation changed drastically in the early 1970s. Pent-up de-
mand from the earlier immigration wave was receding, the inflow of 
cheap capital had ended, and the proletarianization of the Palestin-
ians was coming to a close. Moreover, with the core groups already 
having gained control over much of the economy, further amalgam-
ation was becoming increasingly difficult. And as the breadth regime 
was reaching a dead end, pressures to shift to depth were building up. 
7 The rationale is threefold. First, the vast majority of industrial firms are small, single-estab-
lishment outfits, so changes in average employment by firm and average emplo}ment by es-
tablishment will tend to fluctuate in tandem. Second, most large establishments are owned 
by dominant capital, and since the number of core firms is assumed fixed (five), fluctuations 
in the aggregate emplopnent of large establishments should mirror those of an average core 
firm. Third, although industrial sector employment tends to decline relative to the semce 
sector over the long haul, its cyclical fluctuations are similar to those of the economy as a whole. 
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NOTE: Indices express the ratio between a typical dominant capital 
corporation and the average firm. Series are shown as 3-year moving 
averages, and are rebased with 1968=100. 
SOURCE: Financial reports; Bank of Israel; Central Bureau of Statistics 
The Inflationary Period of the 1970s and 1980s 
Because differential employment growth was negligible during 
the late 1970s and 1980s, our analysis of that period can safely focus 
on depth only, so that: 
(4) DA "" Differential Growth of Profit per Employee 
"" Differential Markup Growth + Differential Inflation + 
Differential Growth of Output per Employee 
The third component of depth - differential growth of output per 
employee - cannot be examined with available data , although that 
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should matter little for the period at hand. The reason is that during 
the late 1970s and 1980s, CDP per capita grew by a meagre 1.4 per-
cent annually, compared with nearly 6 percent during the previous 
quarter century, suggesting that differential growth in output per em-
ployee, if there was any, must have been negligible and can be ig-
nored. For our purpose here, therefore, we can simplify further, 
approximating differential accumulation as a sum of two main com-
ponents only: 
(5) DA '" Differential Markup Growth + Differential Inflation 
This equation, too, cannot be observed directly since there are no 
separate data on the core's markup and rate of inflation. It can be 
deciphered, however, if only tentatively, by roundabout means. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the overall rate of con-
sumer price inflation and our depth index of differential profit per 
employee. The two series moved tightly together until the late 1 980s, 
and then broke apart. The positive correlation of the earlier period 
may have both direct and indirect causes. The obvious, direct link is 
that when overall inflation is on the rise, dominant capital's own rate 
of inflation rises even faster, culminating in differential inflation (and 
vice versa when overall inflation is falling). But inflation can also af-
fect the overall rate of differential accumulation indirectly, even in 
the absence of differential inflation. This will happen if inflation is 
positively correlated with differential markup growth, so when infla-
tion rises the core groups are able to raise their profit share of sales 
faster than the average (and vice versa when inflation falls). Of course, 
both mechanism may operate simultaneously, and as our analysis 
below suggests this seems to have been the case in Israel. 
Differential Inflation: Armament and Finance 
At first sight, the notion that differential inflation can enhance 
differential accumulation seems counter-intuitive. If the large core 
groups raise their prices faster than the average on the depth side, 
will this not "price them out of the market" by undermining their 
differential employment growth on the breadth side? The answer is, 
not necessarily. If these groups were equally present in all sectors, 
then this might indeed be the case. But in the Israeli reality of the 
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1970s and 1980s, there were two key sectors where the core groups 
were probably far more important than elsewhere in the economy: 
armament and finance. 
In both sectors, dominant capital enjoyed something akin to a 
"near monopoly" - not so much that it literally dominated the en-
tire business, but in the sense of facing little profit competition. 
Moreover, since the "product" or "service" of these sectors had no 
close substitutes, their providers confronted practically no inter-
sectoral competition. Under such circumstances, differential infla-
tion could boost depth with a minimal or no impact on breadth. 
Consider first the military sector. Figure 3 correlates the overall 
rate of inflation (based on the GDP deflator), with the relative price 
of military procurement (the so-called "real price"), measured as the 
ratio of the GDP deflator for military procurement to the overall GDP 
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Figure 3 
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SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics 
deflator. The evidence from the chart is rather remarkable. Until the 
early 1970s, military price inflation was lower than overall price in-
flation, causing the relative price of military procurement to fall. One 
possible reason is mismeasurement, but there could be another, sub-
stantive explanation: during that period, military production was not 
yet privatized, so there was greater concern with productivity improve-
ments, as well as an effort to translate productivity gains into lower 
relative prices. 
This honeymoon ended by the mid-1970s. With the core groups 
rapidly displacing state companies as major players in the field, the 
relative price of military procurement not only stopped falling, but 
became closely correlated with inflation. The intensification of the 
Israeli-Arab conflict made the military sector a captured market for the 
core firms, and with little foreign competition (military imports were 
financed by U. S. aid) , the road for differential inflation was wide open. 
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Since the late 1980s, the situation has reversed. Overall inflation 
dropped sharply (for reasons to which we return later), putting down-
ward pressure on military price inflation. Indeed, the downward pres-
sure in the military sector was much stronger than elsewhere in the 
economy: militarization came under growing public scrutiny and calls 
for domestic spending cuts mounted. Under these political circum-
stances, the relative pricing power of the core firms deteriorated rap-
idly, contributing, as the data suggest, to negative differential infla-
tion in that period. 
A similar picture emerges from the financial sector. Here, too, 
the core groups reined supreme, with a government "license" against 
domestic competition, complemented by capital controls which ef-
fectively eliminated external competition. Before examining this case, 
however, an important clarification is in order. The notion of "price" 
in the financial sector is somewhat ambiguous. Note that financial 
intermediaries sell not a product, but a service: a "linking" between 
those who have capital and those who wish to use it. 
Seen in this light, financial intermediation is one of the most 
standardized services, having changed little over the past millennia. 
The cost of providing it, though, has dropped a great deal. The spread 
of universal accounting standards, asset markets and new communi-
cation technologies must have contributed to a huge productivity 
improvement. On the face of it, then, the real cost of intermediation 
should have trended down. Moreover, since we are dealing with rela-
tiveprices, this tendency should have been independent of inflation. 
But that is not what happened in Israel. In Figure 4, we contrast 
the rate of inflation with the interest rate spread between lending and 
deposit rates. Expressed in percentage terms, the latter index mea-
sures the proportionate "cut" financial institutions take from the 
money they move between savers and borrowers. In Israel, this spread, 
instead of remaining fixed or falling, has actually moved up and down 
with inflation. 
Note that according to orthodox theory, such correlation is fully 
justified. Mter all, the income of the financial intermediary has to be 
protected against inflation, so if overall prices rise so must the price 
of intermediation. But there is a catch here. This is because the nomi-
nal amount of deposits and lending is already linked to inflation: the 
higher the inflation the more money is changing hands. The service 
provided by the intermediary, on the other hand, is independent of 
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Figure 4 
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inflation; its inputs and cost are associated not with the nominal 
amounts of money being moved, but with the number of transactions. 
The latter tends to rise with inflation, though not by much, particu-
larly in a highly "indexed" economy such as Israel (wage payments, as 
well as most government transfers and other regular payments, con-
tinued to be made once a month regardless of the rate of inflation). 
In order for the real price of intermediation to remain unchanged, all 
it takes therefore is a fixed interest spread. 
Yet as we have seen, in Israel the interest rate spread has been 
tightly correlated with inflation. The consequence is that instead of 
remaining stable as it should have, real income from intermediation 
rose more than tenfold (!) during the 1975-1985 period (approxi-
mation based on interest rate spreads and the volume of outstand-
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ing credit measured in constant prices, both from the Central Bu-
reau of Statistics). Remarkably, this rise occurred while the volume 
of intermediation remained relatively stable. It was only in the late 
1980s, when inflation started to decline, that intermediation activity 
began picking up again - but then, instead of increasing, the real 
income from intermediation actually went down! In other words, we 
have here a classic case of "Veblenian sabotage," with the income of 
absentee owners rising as they tighten their grip through "industrial 
limitation" and stagflation, and falling when their power loosens, 
growth resumes and inflation subsides. 
To summarize. The core groups, by dominating the military and 
financial sectors, were able to enjoy differential inflation during the 
1970s and early 1980s. Faced with no meaningful rivalry, they kept 
their inflation in these sectors higher than the average, without any 
repercussions on the breadth side. In this way, even with no signifi-
cant changes in differential markups, inflation for them was a prin-
cipal engine of differential accumulation. 
Because of the leading role of the military and finance in the 
Israeli economy at the time, differential inflation by the core firms 
was not only a consequence of overall inflation, but also one of its 
principal causes. During the 1970s and 1980s, it fuelled an upward 
price spiral as other income groups tried to keep up. And when these 
two sectors nearly collapsed - first the financial sector in the early 
1980s, and then the military sector a few years later - their lower 
differential inflation was a major force pulling the overall rate of in-
flation down. We turn to this issue now. 
Differential Redistribution: Wage Income and Capital Gains 
The other component of depth - differential markup growth 
- is considerably more difficult to assess, since there are no markup 
data for either dominant capital or the average firm. But here too, a 
roundabout inquiry can still be instructive. Changes in markup are 
affected largely (although not solely) by the redistributional struggle 
between workers and owners (the other key participants being gov-
ernment and foreign owners). The analysis of differential changes 
in markups therefore requires that we examine this struggle at both 
the level of dominant capital and that of the average firm. 
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As illustrated in Figure 5, labor generally lost from inflation.8 
When inflation started rising in the early 1970s, the wage share of 
CDP fell sharply. Some of the lost ground was recovered during the 
late 1970s, but the gains in pre-tax wages were largely eaten away by 
higher effective tax rates. And as inflation continued to soar during 
the early 1980s, labor again was losing. It was only since the mid-1980s, 
when inflation began to recede, that the net wage share started to 
rise. Inverted, this relationship suggests that the overall income share 
of capital was positively related to inflation, although this in itself does 
not tell us about the markup, which measures specifically the profit 
Figure 5 
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SOURCE: Institute for Social Security; Central Bureau of Statistics 
8 The Central Bureau of Statistics began publishing the "employee compensation" com-
ponent of national income only since th e 1980s. The total wage bill is computed here 
based on separate statistics published regularly by the Institute for Social Security since 
the 1960s. 
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share of income. Insight into the latter can be gained by looking at 
the relationship between inflation and the stock market. 
From an investor's viewpoint, inflation affects equity prices in two 
conflicting ways: it raises expected profit, but it also raises the rate of 
interest used to discount it down to present value, leaving the net 
impact depending on the balance of the two. During the Gilded Age 
of the Israeli stock market, between the early 1970s and early 1980s, 
the first effect clearly dominated. Rising inflation brought soaring 
interest rates, but the stock market rose even faster, suggesting a spec-
tacular, if only implicit, rise in expected profit. There are two pos-
sible reasons for this: one is that investors expected inflation to gen-
erate massive earning gains through redistribution, the other is that 
they were simply manipulated into buying increasingly "overvalued" 
stocks. We consider each reason in turn. 
Figure 6 contrasts the evolution of CPI inflation with that of an 
index of redistribution between owners and workers. The index is 
computed as a ratio between the monthly capital gain from invest-
ment in equities (calculated as first differences between monthly 
observations of the general stock market index) and the average 
monthly pre-tax wage rate. Movements in this index reflect the rela-
tive benefit from owning assets as opposed to owning labor power. 
The chart suggests that until the early 1990s, equity investors tended 
to benefit relative to workers when inflation was rising, and suffer 
when it was falling. In other words, inflation helped redistribute earn-
ings not only in favor of capital income in general, but also in favor 
of profit in particular. Between the late 1970s and mid-1980s, capital 
gains rose roughly five times faster than the average wage rate. From 
the investors' viewpoint, at least some of this relative appreciation 
seems justified - first, given the negative correlation between the 
wage share and inflation shown in Figure 5, and, second, since the 
wage bill is larger than total profit, so when it falls, the relative effect 
on profit is much larger. 
The next question concerns specifically the markup of dominant 
capital. Was the core's own profit share positively correlated with 
inflation, and if so, was the redistributional impact greater than in the 
rest of the business sector? In other words, was inflation helping the 
core groups more than the average firm, hence generating differen-
tial markup growth? In principle, inflation could be associated with 
a differential decline, rather than growth, in the markup (for instance, 
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Figure 6 
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if workers in the core firms are better able to maintain or even raise 
their wage share of sales relative to workers in smaller companies, 
the profit share in the core will fall relative to the average). Although 
we cannot know for sure, this was probably not the case in Israel. The 
reason is that since the early 1970s, dominant capital accounted for 
an increasing share of the stock market's overall capi talization, with 
the three largest banks alone making up 44 percent of the total by 
1982, up from a mere seven percent a decade earlier (Bejsky et at., 
1986, 61). In other words, if the rising stock market indeed reflected 
a general redistribution in favor of profit as we argue, a growing share 
of this redistribution must have been enjoyed by the large core firms . We can 
therefore tentatively conclude that until the mid-1980s, dominant 
capital benefited from both components of equation (5) - differ-
ential inflation as well as differential redistribution . 
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The major caveat in this analysis is that during this Gilded Age, 
stocks became increasingly "overvalued" with investors "discounting" 
an income redistribution far in excess of what was possible in prac-
tice. That in itself of course would be hardly unique to Israel; equity 
prices everywhere are subject to "hype cycles" of excessive optimism 
and pessimism, driven primarily by self-fulfilling expectations about 
asset prices rather than their underlying profit (Nitzan, 1995; 1996). 
What makes the Israeli bubble interesting for our purpose here is, 
first, the mechanism by which hype was inflated and maintained; and, 
second, the impact this had on differential accumulation. 
Until 1982, investor hype was fuelled through a system popularly 
known as "regulation" (Visut, in Hebrew). The largest players were 
the core groups, whose game plan enjoyed the tacit backing of the 
government and the central bank (Bejsky et aI., 1986). Their scheme, 
gradually articulated into a full-fledged conspiracy, was to convince 
the mass of middle- and working-class retail investors that they could 
legitimately expect a pre-determined real capital gain, and that this 
gain would rise with inflation. And for a long time, the promise was 
kept and "everybody" seemed to be gaining. But then the gains were 
hardly even, and what on the surface seemed like a societal panacea 
was in fact a cover-up for massive redistribution. 
The process assumed two principal forms. One was an ongoing 
re-rating of relative stock prices through "financial alchemy" typical 
of mature capitalism with fully vendible capital. Thus, in addition to 
rigging the overall market, the large players (as well as smaller op-
erators) also manipulated individual stocks, generating spectacular 
three-digit price gains per month, usually without any connection to 
the company's actual or expected performance. 
The other redistributional mechanism worked through public 
offerings (POs). According to received economic doctrine, the stock 
market is where entrepreneurs (who make "real investment") meet 
savers (who supply the funds). Their PO marriage contract, in prin-
ciple at least, is for the former to take the money of the latter, put it 
to productive use, and once the investment comes to fruition, split 
the spoils. Since POs are based on expectations for additional profit, 
it should be correlated positively with net investment (leaving replace-
ment investment to be financed through depreciation allowances). 
Intuitive as it may sound, though, this explanation must be missing 
something. Between 1973 and 1982, for instance, net investment 
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dropped from 21 percent of GDP to less than seven percent, yet the 
ratio of POs to GDP, instead offalling, rose tenfold! (POs estimates 
based on first differences in market capitalization deflated by stock 
prices) . 
Impossible? Not really. 'While POs are indeed driven by expecta-
tions for more profit, that in itself does not mandate new productive 
capacity. In fact, under certain conditions, such as those prevailing 
in Israel at the time, the only way to increase profit expectations is to 
curtail productive capacity. During the 1970s and early 1980s, differ-
ential accumulation depended on rapid increases (and expected 
increases) in depth, which in return required limitations on breadth. 
Any attempt to plow PO funds back into production would have there-
fore spelled an excess-capacity disaster, and the possible collapse of 
differential accumulation altogether. It was much better to channel 
the money back into the financial market. 
The eventual 1983 collapse of the stock market demonstrated the 
extent to which the process was driven by hype, but that hype was 
itself a powerful mechanism of redistribution. Established capitalists 
- mostly the core groups - had the market on their side. System-
atically rising stock prices acted as an irresistible magnet, luring fresh 
liquidity from "aspiring capitalists" into POs. This enabled the core 
firms not only to redistribute existing ownership titles through stock 
rigging, but also to create and sell new ones through massive dilu-
tion. When the crash finally came, dominant capital was bailed out 
by the government, whereas most of the less fortunate investors found 
out they owned plenty of "excessive expectations." 
From Capital Accumulation to Inflation 
So far we have considered the effect of inflation on accumula-
tion, but causality also runs in reverse, with accumulation fueling 
inflation. Conventional economic thinking explains inflation as a 
monetary phenomenon of rising liquidity, the famous "too much 
money chasing too few commodities." This, however, is more a de-
scription than an explanation. If the price level is given by the ratio 
between the total quantity of money and the total volume of com-
modities, inflation is by definition a process of rising liquidity, and 
therefore cannot be simultaneously explained by it. The interesting 
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question is why liquidity is rising. The monetarist answer is essentially 
statist: It is all the policy makers' fault. They are the ones controlling 
the money supply; they are the ones who allow it to grow excessively; 
so they are responsible. 
There are two problems with this view. The first, common to all 
statist explanations, is excessive emphasis on human agency. Accord-
ing to this logic, the decline of inflation in the western coun tries since 
the mid-1980s was largely the result of governments and central bank-
ers "getting their act together." But then, why did they not come to 
their senses earlier, and when they finally did see the light, why did it 
happen collectively? More generally, if inflation results from the whim 
of policy makers, why does this whim move in long-term cycles? U n-
less we can answer these questions, inflation remains "indeterminate." 
The second problem is that standard definitions of the "quan-
tity of money," such as MI, M2 and so on, depend not only on how 
much of it is "supplied" by the authorities, but also on how much is 
"demanded" by economic units. What standard theory tends to over-
look is that the latter is predicated on the expectation oj return. With 
the exception of cash, every financial asset - from bank deposits, to 
bank loans, to bonds to stocks - is valued proportionately to its an-
ticipated future earnings. Over the long run , the expansion of such 
assets, or capital, can be sustained only with a parallel growth oj expected 
capital income. This, then, is the missing prelude in the monetarist 
explanation. Instead of: 
money growth -7 inflation 
we should have: 
growth oj expected capital income -7 money growth -7 inflation 
Moreover, the very definition of money as a liability of the financial 
sector is far too narrow for any "money-based" explanation of infla-
tion. If bank deposits are a source of excess demand, why not bonds 
or equities? Surely, the latter are similarly liquid and could be used 
in much the same way to bid up the prices of goods and services. 
Figure 7 illustrates the significance of financial assets for Israeli 
inflation. In it, we chart the annual rate of CPI inflation against the 
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stock market's capitalization, expressed as a percent of GDP and 
lagged two years. Given that the overall value of shares is a major com-
ponent of the so-called "financial assets held by the public," the tight 
correlation between the two series existing until the late 1980s is tell-
ing. Because we are using a lagged series, this correlation suggests 
that during that period, the rising stock market was not only a conse-
quence of inflation, but also one of its major fuels. Thus, if inflation 
is to be attributed to "wrong policy," the blame should be leveled 
against the policy of "regulating" the stock market. With net invest-
ment needs falling, rising stock prices and the tidal wave of POs 
flooded the economy with fresh liquidity, propping up inflation. (The 
situation has changed markedly since the early 1990s, when the re-
sumption of growth helped absorb the liquidity of a soaring market, 
leaving little fuel for stroking inflation.) 
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According to mainstream economic theory, inflation is a real mon-
ster. "Like diseases, inflation shows different levels of severity," write 
Samuelson, Nordhaus and McCallum (1988,240-242) in their intro-
ductory textbook, ranging all the way from the "moderate" to the 
"galloping" to the "hyper." The first strain of the disease is associated 
only with the moderate cost of "inefficiency"; the second generates 
"serious economic distortions"; whereas the third, which the authors 
label alternatively as a "deadly virus" and a "cancer," has practically 
"nothing good" about it. 
Limited to the macroeconomic dimension, these characteriza-
tions fail to account for the redistributive aspect of inflation in gen-
eral, and for its role in differential accumulation in particular. From 
a relative viewpoint, inflation cannot be labeled as universally "good" 
or "bad": whatever it does to harm the well-being of some, will, by 
definition and for the same reason, advance the interests of others. 
Distributive explanations of inflation are not new, of course. In 
Latin America, for instance, rapid inflation has often been associated 
with "structural" and "tug-of-war" theories. According to Hirschman 
(1985), however, this literature remains problematic. It shows that 
inflation indeed causes redistribution, but fails to explain why the 
same result cannot be achieved by other, more effective methods. 
Hirschman's criticism is relevant for our purpose, both for its insight 
and shortcomings. 
The Latin American variety of structural inflation theories em-
phasized the role of production bottlenecks. Tug-of-war explanations 
are similar, only that instead of economic structure, they focus on 
the role of aggressive social attitudes. Combining the two, Hirschman 
offers a synthesis in which an aggressive society, when encountering 
structural bottlenecks, becomes prone to inflationary spirals, lead-
ing to both redistribution and restructuring. 
The standard monetarist claim against this thesis is that in the 
long-run distribution is determined only by "real" economic forces, 
not by monetary phenomena, and that inflationary redistribution is 
therefore largely ephemeral. Hirschman agrees that the initial impact 
of inflation may differ from its final consequences - though that in 
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itself does not make it neutral. The reason is that the monetarist 
conception of "real" economic forces, because of their belief in per-
fect competition, is far too narrow. In a non-competitive environment, 
the balance of political power and strategic economic positions are 
as "real" as technology and physical resources. In Brazil, for instance, 
inflation was a principal vehicle of industrialization: combined with 
a fixed exchange rate, it undermined resource exports while encour-
aging machinery imports, thus contributing to an irreversible redis-
tribution from the primary to the secondary sector. 
Yet, even then, the riddle remains. Although inflation does re-
distribute income and alters structure, it is hardly the most "efficient" 
way of doing so. In fact, most other forms of redistribution (such as 
universal suffrage, shorter work week, pension payments, public 
medical care, government contracts and subsidies) are far more du-
rable, and once achieved, are more difficult to reverse. Why, then, 
given the availability of "superior" methods of redistribution, do eco-
nomic agents continue to use inflation as a vehicle for redistribution? 
There are two common answers, both of which are unsatisfac-
tory according to Hirschman. One is that economic agents simply do 
not recognize this "inefficiency" of inflation. Such misconceptions, 
though, cannot persist for long, argues Hirschman, since agents 
quickly learn that inflationary gains are easy to lose. The other ex-
planation is that agents are caught in a "prisoner's dilemma," where 
intra-group dynamics force them to act as "rational fools," as Amartya 
Sen put it. This, however, is valid only in a competitive context. When 
the social arena is instead dominated by large corporations, labor 
unions and the state, a negotiated redistributional outcome is usu-
ally feasible without inflation. The puzzle of "why inflation" there-
fore persists. 
The answer, according to Hirschman, lies not so much in the 
outcome, as in the struggle itself. His explanation, somewhat reminis-
cent of our own power theory of accumulation, is that the real pur-
pose of a tug-of-war inflation is not higher standards of living, but 
the very inflicting of damage: 
In a situation of high social tension and group antagonism, such behavior 
could come to be engaged in less for its normally expected material result 
- additional real income - than because it is enjoyed for its own sake. This 
means inverting the usual mean-ends relationship; the gratification of in-
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tergroup hostility that is obtained by the achievement of a highly inflation-
ary price or wage rise can be the real benefit, to the point where it would 
not matter if inflation eroded, totally and in short order, the gains achieved. 
(Hirschman, 1985,71.) 
Inflation, according to Hirschman, is in fact a relatively peaceful valve 
for social tensions which could otherwise culminate in an open civil 
war: "With inflation," he states, "each group is able to engage in con-
flictive behavior and to demonstrate its power and its antagonism to 
the other groups. From this point it is not far to the conclusion that 
such demonstration is an important function of inflation, and per-
haps its real motive" (71-72). 
For all its insights, Hirschman's analysis has one significant weak-
ness: it makes inflation an extra-capitalist phenomenon. Mter all, in-
flation is neither new nor unique to Latin America. Arguing that it is 
the result of vicious people playing an endless 'Tll-show-you" game 
against one another, and that this is a substitute for civil war, is hardly 
a satisfactory theory. Hirschman does not provide evidence that the 
distribution of income in Latin America was largely unaltered by 
inflation, nor should we expect this to be the case elsewhere. For 
example, is it reasonable to say that the redistributional effects of 
German inflation in the 1920s could have been achieved more effec-
tively by bargaining? Or can we characterize Israeli inflation of the 
1970s and 1980s as a substitute for civil war? More generally, if infla-
tion is merely a weapon in an innate conflict, why does it not persist 
indefinitely, but rather move in long cycles? In our view, Hirschman 
is right to emphasize predatory instincts, but his insight can be made 
much more useful as part of a broader theory of capitalism. The 
theory of differential accumulation could provide such a framework. 
Our analysis in this paper argues that inflation is one of several 
means of differential accumulation. In the Israeli case, inflation 
started to rise when the conditions underwriting the earlier breadth 
regime were no longer sustainable. With proletarianization and for-
eign aid drying up, differential accumulation by dominant capital 
could continue only through an inflationary expansion of depth. In 
principle, differential accumulation could be sustained even without 
a m~or redistribution from labor to capital, provided that the core 
could maintain its own rate of inflation faster than the average. The 
Israeli experience suggests that such differential inflation was indeed 
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paramount, particularly in the military and finance sectors, but that 
the rate of differential redistribution was probably positive as well. 
In this context, politicians and central bankers operate more as 
moderators than as "policy makers." According to Brenner and Galai 
(1984), during the 1970s both the government and the banks were 
in fact forced into regulating the prices of financial assets - the 
former in order to finance its (exogenously) growing deficit, the lat-
ter in order to keep their capital adequacy at internationally accepted 
levels. From a differential accumulation perspective, though, there 
was nothing inevitable about this process. As the breadth regime was 
coming to a close by the late 1960s, the core groups faced two pos-
sible scenarios: a shift to depth or collapsing differential accumula-
tion. As it turned out, the first scenario materialized, but there is 
nothing deterministic about this outcome. A combination of global 
circumstances and deliberate domestic choices enabled a "smooth" 
shift into depth, so as to continue differential accumulation by other 
means. Israel's increasing involvement in the Middle East conflict 
justified higher military budgets and capital controls, which in turn 
led to the financial explosion in the bond and stock markets. And 
with this process in motion, the next logical step was to allow banks 
to regulate the stock market, so as to prevent the process from get-
ting out of hand. The effect on macroeconomic indicators, as well as 
on most of the citizenry, may have been negative, but the impact on 
differential accumulation was clearly positive. 
The government's other important role was to maintain the in-
stitution of indexation. As we emphasized earlier, inflation is an open-
ended process, in that prices could rise without bound. But as infla-
tion rises so does the risk of "total loss," particularly for workers 
(consider the impact on the purchasing power of a fixed wage when 
annual inflation runs at 300 or 400 percent). Although such losses 
could spell enormous gains for other social groups (as attested by the 
hyper-inflation of Germany and Austria before the Second World 
War, or in Russia during the 1990s), they also create systemic risk for 
the social structure as whole. This is where indexation comes in. 
Mainstream economists correctly point out that indexation is a 
major factor allowing inflation to continue. They are wrong, though, 
in suggesting that removing indexation will make inflation go away. 
Inflation exists not because of indexation, but the other way around. 
The main latent function of indexation is to protect capitalists, which 
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it does indirectly by partly sheltering workers from the vagaries of 
inflation. This point is often misunderstood and deserves further 
elaboration. Critiques on the left commonly accuse the Israeli gov-
ernment offully indexing its obligations to capitalists, while keeping 
wages only partly indexed. Although correct, this observation is of 
only secondary significance. The more important service for capital 
is that indexation smoothes the impact on wages of inflation. The 
reason is that inflation can never be fully controlled - neither by 
capitalists nor by governments. Hence, if inflation is to be used as a 
means of differential accumulation, it needs indexation in order to 
prevent unanticipated deviations from pushing workers too close to 
the brink. 
Of course, full indexation will make inflation useless as a means 
of redistribution. So once in place, the trick is to make indexation 
only partial, and this is where the state comes into the picture. Its role 
is to manipulate both the extent and timing of indexation, based on 
the degree to which inflation deviates from its "desirable" path, and 
on the threat it posses for social stability. This also suggests that the 
most effective way of ending inflation is not to eliminate indexation, 
but rather to impose full indexation, as illustrated by the Brazilian 
Plano Real of 1994. 
5. THE END OF INFLATION: 
TOWARD A NEW BREADTH REGIME 
Although inflation could support differential accumulation indefi-
nitely, at least technically, the process is politically unsustainable. In 
contrast to breadth, which usually comes together with growth and 
rising standards of living, depth is commonly accompanied by stag-
nation, and hence by heightened social conflict. For dominant capi-
tal, this conflict appears as growing inability to "manage" macroeco-
nomic variables. Moreover, as inflation rises so does the risk that 
secondary players, for instance large stock-market speculators, might 
out-maneuver dominant capital. 
In the Israeli context, the first cracks in the depth regime ap-
peared in 1982 with the collapse of the "free stocks" (small capitaliza-
tion shares, whose prices were less tightly rigged), to be followed nine 
months later by the crash of the banking shares. The consequence 
was a sharp fall in the ratio of capital gains to wages (Figure 6). To 
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prevent a decummulation meltdown, the government stepped in with 
a massive bailout plan, which meant further liquefaction of the sys-
tem and even faster inflation. But capitalist confidence was seriously 
shaken, and with the middle class badly hurt and no longer willing 
to hold shares, that was merely sufficient to keep the capital gain/ 
wage ratio at its new lower level. In parallel, the U. S. elite began 
demanding an end to the depth regime. One reason was that high 
spending provided Israeli military contractors with enough of a 
threshold to enter into main battle systems development. Their 
U. S. counterparts found this unacceptable, and Israel was duly forced 
to curtail its domestic military budget (as opposed to arms imports), 
and abandon its grandiose plans for its own fighter aircraft. Another 
reason was that the U. S. Administration became concerned that in-
flation may bring serious social instability. To highlight its resolve, 
Washington dispatched a team of economists, led by Herbert Stein 
and Stanley Fischer, to draft a ten-point stabilization program, known 
as "Herb's 1 0 Points." The program, secured by a $1.5 billion standby 
facility to ward off currency speculators, followed the standard IMF 
template of devaluation, tight monetary and fiscal policy and, of 
course, a significant wage erosion. Although the plan was presented 
as a mere "recommendation," the Israeli government was hardly in a 
position to ignore it. 
The result was the 1985 New Economic Plan (NEP). In the de-
cade following the stabilization plan, Israeli economists have often 
congratulated the government for finally taking a bold stand, swal-
lowing the bitter medicine they recommended all along. From the 
perspective of differential accumulation, however, the plan was hardly 
"bold." With both military spending and the stock market in tatters, 
dominant capital faced a grave risk. For decades, consensus among 
the elites was bolstered by an ongoing process of differential accu-
mulation - first through breadth and then through a concerted 
manipulation of depth. But with a melting stock market and the con-
sequent collapse of differential accumulation, this consensus broke 
down. 
It was from this point onward, when it could no longer stand as 
the central pillar of differential accumulation, that inflation turned 
into a "public enemy." The most pressing need was to stabilize the 
profit of dominant capital, and since inflation could no longer do 
the job, the onus fell on wages. In order to do so, though, it was first 
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necessary to create the proper crisis atmosphere and a consequent 
need for "sacrifice." Paradoxically, this was not easy. The problem 
was that for years, workers were repeatedly told that they were the 
big winners from inflation (through their "excessive" wage demands). 
But if so, why would they give up this perk now? Clearly, the "cost" 
had to be re-articulated, and as it turned out there was no shortage 
of volunteers. Kleiman (1984), for instance, identified five heavy 
burdens: the wasteful activity associated with frequent re-pricing of 
products (such as putting new pricing stickers on goods and making 
new price lists); the cost oflearning new prices and the loss of human 
capital embedded in (ephemeral) knowledge of nominal values; the 
risk of capital loss from financial speculation; the "acute sense of frus-
tration" associated with heightened uncertainty; and last but not least, 
the "sorrow oflost opportunities" and the cost of mistaken decisions. 
According to Kleiman's own arithmetic, over the five-year period end-
ing in 1982, the societal burden associated with these losses 
amounted to 3-4 percent ofGDP, which, in his opinion was what the 
public (that is, workers) should be willing to forego in order to have 
inflation stop dead in its tracks. 
And so by the mid-1980s, the preconditions for a regime shift were 
all in place: a differential accumulation crisis of unprecedented pro-
portions, mounting pressures from the United States to change 
course, and an ideological front, erected with impressive academic 
support, on the necessity of "sacrifice." The clear target was labor. 
The breadth route was closed, and so was differential inflation. The 
only means of preventing further drops in differential accumulation 
was differential redistribution through wage erosion. 
The centerpiece of the 1985 NEP was price and wage controls. 
The reason is that while dominant capital knew what it wanted, it 
could not achieve it on its own. It needed an external moderator, and 
this is where the state again became crucial. A particular regime of 
differential accumulation is based on a broad consensus, common 
habits of thinking and similar modes of behavior. Since these con-
ventions often tend to acquire their own inertia, a transition from one 
regime to another often requires outside "intervention." 
The elite does not see it in these terms, of course. Given the 
antagonistic appearance of differential accumulation, it rarely ac-
knowledges, even to itself, the cooperative aspects of its endeavor. 
The Israeli upward price spiral was propagated by a complex set of 
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open and tacit collusions among the big "price makers." This could 
not be freely admitted, of course, so the blame was duly assigned to 
"inflationary expectations." But then what are these expectations if 
not the consensus of the elite itself? To change expectations there-
fore is to change the outlook of the elite, and this is when an exter-
nal actor like the government becomes handy. 
This logic is evident in a recent assessment of the NEP written by 
David Brodet (1995), who, as an official of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry at the time, was responsible for wage and price controls. 
Orthodox macroeconomic policies, he writes, are necessary but in-
sufficient for taming galloping inflation. The main problem is iner-
tia, and that can be broken only with direct controls. Specifically, 
agents have to be "convinced" that prices can move down as well as 
up, which is why he implemented the so-called "pair policy," in which 
for every price the ministry raised, another was lowered. 
But then changing the "price mentality," as Brodet puts it, was 
largely a means to an end. In our view, the ultimate goal was to alter 
the "profit mentality." Specifically, price controls were designed, if 
only implicitly, to show that from now on, redistribution is to be 
achieved not through price inflation but through wage deflation. And 
this was the NEP's Achilles' Heel. 
Unlike inflation, which leaves prices unbounded on the upside, 
wage deflation has definite limits, particularly when combined with 
a highly contractionary "stabilization" policy. And, indeed, the eco-
nomic recovery of 1985-87 was short lived, and inflation, while low 
by previous standards, remained at two-digit levels. The government 
responded by jacking up real interest rates, and growth collapsed once 
more. Of course, the official culprit was again labor. According to 
Fischer (1995,595), things were working fine until workers started 
to protest their falling income, and then ')ust as it was about to win 
the war, the government signed a most generous contract with the 
Histadrut [Confederation of Labor Unions] ." Workers again started 
to spend, he laments, leaving the central bank with little choice but 
to hit the monetary breaks and kill the recovery. 
Seen from a differential accumulation perspective, though, macro-
economic tightening was a dead end from the very start. The substi-
tute for depth is breadth, and indeed, it was only with the immigra-
tion boom of the 1990s that things began to move. The "miracle" that 
followed had little to do with bold politicians and correct policy, 
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however. It was mostly anchored in the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
which unleashed an influx of over 800,000 new immigrants, an ac-
companying investment boom, and most importantly, the prospects 
for joining the globalization process. Together, these processes have 
finally convinced the Israeli elite (as well as many foreign investors) 
that a new breadth phase was in the making. 
However, such a new phase, if it is to unfold, will have to rely 
increasingly on expansion outside ofIsrael. The domestic corporate 
scene remains highly concentrated, there is little prospect for a new 
immigration wave, and most of the population has already been pro-
letarianized. For Israel's dominant capital, it is now the outside 
world where the opportunity for breadth lies. To realize this prom-
ise both regionally and globally, the core groups need stability, and 
so in an ironic historical twist, the same corporations which previ-
ously supported the war economy are now the principal defenders 
of peace. 
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